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LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACTION AND
ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Timothy J. Brennan*
I. Introduction
At least partly as a result of the Supreme Court decision in Commu-
nity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder,' cities are facing anti-
trust challenges to their rights to franchise cable television systems. 2
Other municipal activities have been similarily challenged. 3 The pros-
pect of costly and uncertain antitrust litigation challenging local gov-
ernment actions will restrict the scope and extent of local regulatory
activity. Such restriction could, in turn, preempt city residents' ability
* University of Maryland, B.A., 1973; University of Wisconsin, Ph. D., 1978. The
author is an economist with the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice.
The opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Department or any of its
employees. Comments of Wayne D. Collins, Robert McGuckin, Phillip Warren, and
the editors of the Fordham Urban Law Journal are most appreciated. Any errors are
the responsibility of the author.
1. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
2. See, e.g., Omega Satellite Products Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119
(7th Cir. 1982); Berkshire Cablevision of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Burke, 571 F. Supp.
976 (D.R.I. 1983); Hopkinsville Cable TV, Inc. v. Pennroyal Cablevision, Inc., 562
F. Supp. 543 (W.D. Ky. 1982).
3. See, e.g. Central Iowa Refuse Systems, Inc. v. Des Moines Metropolitan
Solid Waste Agency, 715 F.2d 419, 424, 426-27 (8th Cir. 1983) (metropolitan waste
agency qualified for state action exemption); Omni Outdoor Advertising v. Colum-
bia Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (D.S.C. 1983) (municipal
corporation engaged in erecting and leasing of billboards not exempt from liability
under Sherman Act); Capital Telephone Co., Inc. v. City of Schenectady, 560 F.
Supp. 207, 210 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (municipal authority to grant franchises not subject
to antitrust laws); Gold Cross Ambulance & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705
F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1983) (contesting municipal provision of ambulance service);
Hanky v. City of Richmond, 532 F. Supp. 1298 (E.D. Va. 1982) (contesting zoning
decision denying right to build hotel); Wyatt v. City of Pensacola, 196 So. 2d 777
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (invalidating zoning ordinance excluding new dry clean-
ing business for 3 years).
Zoning by definition restrains trade by means of restrictions which affect commer-
cial land use. See Note, Antitrust and Zoning-How Much Respect For Local Gov-
eminent?, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 901, 903 (1982). Zoning actions which exclude
certain business uses or preclude business use by all but a single user have been
challenged under state antitrust laws, id. at 904-07, and are susceptible to attack
under the Sherman Act (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). Id. at 907. See also
Stauffer v. Town of Grand Lake, Civ. Action No. 80-A-752, slip op. (D. Colo. Dec.
15, 1980).
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to choose, through their elected representatives, the goods and services
they prefer.4
This Article proposes that as a matter of policy the burden of
proving a municipal antitrust violation should be on those who seek to
restrict municipal action. The necessary limitations on municipal anti-
trust liability can be properly identified by analogizing city actions to
private economic actions. This perspective is consistent with the as-
sumptions required to judge policies by their predicted economic
effects. 5 This Article discusses the merits behind the general case for
municipal antitrust immunity and the specific circumstances in which
cities might face liability under antitrust laws.
Part II of this Article sets out three criteria by which the potential
for adverse effects of a city's action may be determined. 6 These criteria
are derived from the principles underlying the presumption that inde-
pendent individual decisions lead to economic outcomes that are pref-
erable to those achieved through central planning. 7 Of particular
importance and complexity is the determination of when a locality's
public decision-making procedures appropriately reflect the views of
its residents." The practical application of these criteria is illustrated
by a simplified example of cable television franchising.9 Part III as-
sesses the leading "state action" cases using the criteria developed in
Part II.10 This case law emphasizes the propriety of decision-making
4. See Comment Alternative Approaches to Municipal Antitrust Liability, ii
FOnDHAM UmB. L. J. 51, 52-53 n.12 (1983) (discussing uncertainty of municipal
antitrust liability after Boulder).
5. See infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of these assump-
tions.
6. These criteria can be expressed as three questions: (1) would it be more
efficient to have a single decision on the issue made for all cities than to have each
city make its own?, see infra notes 22-26 and accompanying text; (2) would a single-
decision maker be adequately motivated to reflect the desires of each city's residents?,
see inJra notes 27-60 and accompanying text; and (3) would a single decision better
protect the interests of those who do not reside in the city? See infra notes 61-71 and
accompanying text.
7. It is important to emphasize at the outset that these criteria are derived from
the normative assumption that people ought to receive what they desire to purchase
and what they are willing and able to pay for. This assumption is not universally
applicable. Arguably, in some cases the citizens' ability to make choices should be
constrained by the state because of incompetence (e.g., proscribing certain medical
treatments) or because such actions are morally unacceptable (e.g., proscribing race
discrimination). Where significant non-economic concerns are pertinent to an issue,
they should be given serious consideration.
8. See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 83-146 and accompanying text.
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procedures and neglects the effects on those citizens outside the local-
ity. Further, the Supreme Court's distinction between state and city
activity cannot be justified under the derived criteria."' Part IV de-
scribes appropriate policies for dealing with potentially inefficient city
actions and makes specific recommendations consistent with the cur-
rent case law.12
II. Economic Criteria for Federal Restriction of Municipal Activity
A. General Principles
The theorems of economic analysis that speak to the optimal wel-
fare properties of competitive allocations do not mention decentral-
ized, "free market" institutions. The theorems themselves are consist-
ent with central planning. Much of this theory's development has
derived from economists who are less concerned with true market
performance but more interested in how a central planner should
instruct its managers to behave. Indeed, some economists have criti-
cized these "efficiency" notions and theorems on the grounds that they
lend false credence to the view that a central planner can completely
manage an economy. 13
The choice to rely on decentralized rather than centralized deci-
sions does not flow from the fundamental efficiency theorems of
economic analysis. 14 Rather, its support in economic theory is drawn
11. See text following infra notes 121 & 134.
12. See infra notes 147-69 and accompanying text.
13. For example, a central planner could set prices and cause consumers and
firms to act competitively; that is, take prices as given when making purchase or
production decisions. The planner, rather than the marketplace, could theoretically
adjust prices to correct supply or demand imbalances. See Lange, On The Economic
Theory of Socialism, in M. GOLDMAN, COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 21 (1971).
Much of the argument is that the idealistic view of the ability of the central planner
to allocate resources efficiently neglects the practical problems involved in the alloca-
tion. These problems are described in infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. See
Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J. LAW ECON. 1, 19
(1969); Rizzo, Uncertainty, Subjectivity and the Economic Analysis of Law in TIME,
UNCERTAINTY AND DISEQuILIBRIUM 71, 81 (M. Rizzo ed. 1979).
14. There are two major optimality theorems. The first is that goods are allo-
cated "efficiently" in a "competitive" context. Here, "competition" is defined as an
environment in which consumers and firms act as if they have no influence on price.
This passive, "price-talking" behavior is different from the "comipetitive" behavior of
an active contest among various contenders for a reward. The relevance of this
conception is that in ideal markets there are so many consumers and firms (either
actual sellers or potential entrants) that no one of them can affect price through its
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
from three assumptions. First, decentralized decision-making coordi-
nated through price signals can process the preference and cost infor-
mation necessary to make effective allocations more efficiently, pri-
marily because it avoids the costs involved in centralizing this
information."5 Second, those affected by the outcome of an economic
decision have the most incentive to take actions that maximize their
economic welfare. The free market, supported by private property
rights, provides this incentive by ensuring that the rewards from the
efficient allocation of a commodity flow to the agent having the
power to determine how it is used. 16 Third, no inefficiencies are
induced by adverse effects on those who are not parties to the deci-
sion. One of the standard sources of "market failure" involves exter-
nalities; decisions by agents which affect others who cannot "signal"
their preferences through the market mechanism.17
These assumptions may be illustrated by an example. Suppose X
wants to buy a car from Firm Y. The economist normally assumes that
X should be allowed to buy that car. It is assumed that X knows
whether the car satisifies his needs, Firm Y has the incentive to
maximize the welfare of its stockholders, and no one else is affected by
the transaction. However, suppose that either (1) it is too costly for X
to satify himself that the car meets minimum acceptable performance
standards, (2) Firm Y is known (somehow) to be inherently wasteful,
or (3) Z will become ill from breathing the fumes from X's new car.
own relatively insignificant supply or demand decisions. "Efficiency" in this discus-
sion means that there is no way to reallocate goods to make someone better off
without making someone else worse off. This notion of "efficiency" is compatible
with virtually any income distribution from perfectly egalitarian to one person
owning all goods. The second theorem states that any efficient allocation of goods
can be achieved by redistributing wealth and then letting the competitive market run
its course. For the formal statement of these theorems, see generally G. DEBREU, THE
THEORY OF VALUE 94-96 (1959). See also A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES IN
PUBLIC ECONOMIES 343 (1980) (less formal presentation of the theorem).
15. In essence, centralization is unnecessary because the information can be used
at its sources: the consumers and firms who enjoy the benefits and bear the costs of
economic decisions. See I. KIRZNlR, COMPETITION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 230 (1973).
16. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 10 (1973).
17. See E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS 372 (1979). POSNER, supra note 16, at
52, defines an externality as something outside of the decision-making process. Posner
cautions that "if 'externality' is defined as external to market processes of decision
rather than to the injurer, it is still a misleading usage because low transaction costs
may enable the market to operate efficiently despite the presence of externalities. Id.
An externality is created "when an activity by one or more parties affects, for good or
bad, another one or more parties who are not a part of, or are external to, the
activity." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS 357 (D. Greenwald, ed. 1982).
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Under (1), the assumption that individual consumers know their needs
best could be violated and could warrant centralized imposition of
minimum standards. Under (2), the assumption that nominal owners
have the incentive to look out for their best interests may be violated,
justifying in some circumstances laws requiring certain fiduciary re-
sponsibilities of firm officers to stockholders. Under (3), an outside
party is affected; if private transaction costs are high enough, imposi-
tion of an anti-pollution tax may be warranted. 'I Hence, we see that if
any of these assumptions are violated, we can no longer guarantee
that decentralized action leads to the most efficient outcome.
B. Application to Municipal Action
If reliance on decentralized decision-making is based on the high
costs of centralizing information and the provision of proper incen-
tives to maximize values by putting decisions in the hands of the
affected parties,' 9 application of this principle to collective decisions
dictates that a decision be made by a group no larger than the set of
agents potentially affected by the outcome of the decision.2 0 Conse-
quently, without further analysis, the theoretical presumption consist-
ent with economic reasoning is that federal intervention in a matter
affecting only the citizens within a smaller governmental unit is un-
warranted. 2' Three justifications arguably overcome the presumption
and warrant consideration.
18. See MANSFIELD, supra note 17, at 378.
19. Another possible reason for decentralizing decision-making is that if A is not
affected by B's actions, A arguably has no justification to interfere with B's choices.
Although many economists share this belief in classical liberalism, it will be neglected
in this discussion to maintain the focus on the more strictly economic considerations
of costs and incentives. A recent statement of this view is R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE
AND UTOPIA (1975). See also A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 79-80
(1970).
20. More precisely, there is a point at which there is likely to be a tradeoff
between dispersing information within this group and ensuring that the group in-
cludes all potentially affected parties. The optimal group, then, generally would be
smaller than the set of all affected parties. See J. BUCHANAN & C. TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT 113 (1962). Since the issue before us, however, is whether a
larger group, the United States, should make decisions affecting a smaller group, a
city, the principle that all affected parties should participate in the decision should
control.
21. This statement is based on the theoretical application of the presumptions
stated in supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text. It is not a factual argument for
reliance on decentralized decision-making.
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1. Economies of Expertise
The first argument in favor of federal intervention is that there may
be economies of centralizing expertise. For some decisions based upon
technical information, it may be costly for each municipality to sup-
ply the necessary expertise. Economies of scale in acquiring, process-
ing, and evaluating information may warrant centralization of some
decisions. 22 For example, if it is less costly for the federal government
to evaluate the effects of certain pollutants than for each locality to
perform the research, it could be more efficient to have federal gov-
ernment regulation rather than force each locality to independently
study the problem and set appropriate policies. 23
Municipalities can and do employ experts to make determinations
when they judge the issues to be within their areas of concern, but
beyond their own expertise. 24 Thus, even if there are economies inher-
ent in compiling and handling large quantities of complex informa-
tion, an advocate of federal intervention must justify the federal
government's assumption of the role of the effective decision-maker.
Rather than restrict local government activity, the federal govern-
ment could provide its expertise at marginal cost to the cities. 25 This
could be accomplished, for example, through general publications,
specific comments or regulatory filings. 26
22. This is analogous to an argument that some "individual" decisions are best
made by government. As illustrated in the example discussing automobile purchases
and air pollution, text preceding supra note 18, a potential rationale for some so-
called "consumer" legislation is that purchasing decisions require knowledge and
ability that can be acquired collectively by the government at less expense than if
each individual consumer did the same research. The argument against this kind of
protective legislation, however, is that the market can supply the needed information
and consumers can utilize outside expertise on their own if they so choose. This
response also applies to legislation intended to protect cities or states from potential
problems.
23. See, e.g., Hartman, Alternatives for Regulatory Control of Acid Rain in the
Northeastern United States, 11 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 455, 460-61 (1983) (discussing
federal agency research, funding and program development to enforce Clean Air
Act).
24. Id. at 481 (interstate monitoring of air quality by EPA experts).
25. See infra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
26. If cities or localities have significantly unusual problems, it is less likely that
the federal government can find less expensive solutions than those listed. This.
rationale favoring federal intervention would apply only to problems which are
common throughout a broad class of localities. See, e.g., Shabecoff, U.S. Prohibits
Use of Pesticide Tied To Animal Cancer, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 6
(Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) suggested safe guideline levels of pesticide
EDB in grain products while avoiding mandatory limits; states allowed to set indi-
vidual limits based on EPA data and state's own findings).
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2. Procedural Integrity
a. Theory
The second argument for federal intervention is that collective
decision-making through the typical municipal mechanism does not
reflect the preferences of local constituents. 27 There are many reasons
why this may be so. The method of majority rule, whatever its other
virtues or flaws as a social choice mechanism, 28 does not permit the
direct comparisons of valuation which are available through bids in a
market. 29 Of course, if the number of votes or the nature of post-
election decisions are influenced through monetary expenditure, 30 this
flaw may be somewhat less important from an economic perspec-
tive. 31 Another problem is that voters typically choose from only a few
candidates who take positions on a large number of issues, thereby
making specific valuations on single issues difficult to represent elec-
torally. In addition, it is difficult to monitor the performance of
elected or appointed officials to ensure that their behavior reflects the
preferences of the electorate. For example, a local power commission
may give greater consideration to the interests of the electric compa-
ny's stockholders than to the more diffuse needs of the electricity users.
Despite significant evidence of local government malpractice, it is
difficult to prove that federal government intervention will result in
systematic improvements. 32 When municipal government mecha-
nisms lead to predictably inefficient behavior, however, restriction of
municipal authority may be warranted.33 An obvious theoretical
27. This theory is analogous to the claim that a decision-maker may not have the
incentive to act in the best interests of those affected by its decisions.
28. See SEN, supra note 19, at 72, 184.
29. Examples of factors which have indirect influence within the voting process
include lobbying and campaign contributions.
30. Voting supplies "A" or "B" type statements, but it offers little guidance
concerning the relative levels of commitment among A and B supporters. Theoreti-
cally, a minority strongly supporting A would be willing to pay a majority supporting
B enough to change the majority to support A. Even though politicians compete for
votes, simple elections cannot provide a venue to make these other economic tra-
deoffs to achieve efficient social choices.
31. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 20, at 154. The authors argue that the
economic distortions of the sort described in supra note 29 and accompanying text
can be reduced through side payments among voters.
32. See generally, G. STIGLER, THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE (1975).
33. See supra note 14. As noted in the automobile example, text preceding supra
note 18, private institutions may not fully reflect the preferences of their "constitu-
ents."
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problem is that the congressional, executive and judicial bodies which
create federal restrictions on local activities are national in scope.
3 4
The problems inherent in the electoral process 35 appear even more
severe at the national level. The mere identification of local imperfec-
tions does not, by itself, justify federal intervention.
b. Application
The problem of applying a procedural integrity criterion raises an
important question: by what standard does one decide that local
political institutions are misrepresenting their constituents? Since this
question does not appear to have a totally satisfying answer, the best
one can do is analyze the advantages and disadvantages of probable
answers. This Article will argue that the optimal choice among the
unsatisfactory alternatives is to find misrepresentation only when es-
tablished political procedures are being subverted.3 6
i. General Ethics
Arguably, local political institutions fail when they do not produce
the distribution of goods within a locality that "best" merges the needs
of the citizens with principles of distributive justice, allocative effi-
ciency and ethical rights. Under a criterion of general ethics, "failure"
would be a relative term which compares the achieved result to an
ethical model of this "best" condition. Given the normative aspect of
the term "failure" in this context, it is not surprising that federal
intervention in state or local affairs might be justified by appeals to
broad ethical considerations.
This concept of "failure" is central in designing constitutions and
legislative actions to avoid it.37 Some commentators have suggested
that these considerations may be relevant in judicial decisions as
well. 38 Considering the uncertainties and disagreements regarding
both ethical theories and the practical issue of whether the central
34. For purposes of this Article, the right of private antitrust action against
municipalities is interpreted as essentially a grant by Congress to private parties to
restrict local action as interpreted by federal executive agencies and courts. See
generally, J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
121-37 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing establishment of legal basis for federal authority).
35. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
37. For example, one might argue that the Bill of Rights is intended to ensure an
ethically justifiable distribution of basic political and civil rights to each individual.
See U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
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government is more or less likely to perform normatively better than
local governments, this Article will adopt a narrow approach to the
antitrust liability question.
ii. Efficiency
Government decision-making is not the only category of action that
may be subjected to ethical analysis. Private actions, either individual
or collective, may also be so analyzed. The broad range of ethical
issues is not usually considered when deciding whether to impose
antitrust liability.3 9 For example, the social propriety of consuming
alcohol would not be relevant to a prosecutor or judge who must
argue or decide whether to permit a merger that might reduce beer
supplies. 40 A more useful antitrust consideration is the recognition of
the social interest in maximizing the economic value of society's total
output, regardless of such ethical considerations. 41 Moreover, unlike
alternate objectives such as the protection of small business to preserve
individual autonomy and the entrepreneurial spirit, it is alleged that
economic efficiency has the virtues of being operational, well defined
and objectively verifiable. 42
It is questionable whether a strict efficiency analysis possesses these
advantages when it is applied to the actions of local governments. The
operational value of the efficiency standard is derived largely from the
assumption that by focusing on only the supply and demand schedules
in the relevant market, a court has all the information required to
judge the efficiency of an industry practice. The chief problem with
this standard is its neglect of externalities. 43 For example, courts
38. See Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); C. FRIED,
CONTRACT AND PROMISE (1981).
39. See R. 'POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 8-22 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as ANTITRUST LAW].
40. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973) (allowing
Falstaff, a principal national beer distributor, to enter the New England market by
acquiring the region's largest seller of beer). The Court did consider "'temperance" as
a potential justification for a California program maintaining wholesale prices for
wine, but rejected it on empirical grounds. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 112. See infra notes 125-31 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Midcal case.
41. See Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Con-
mon Law" Nature of Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 693 (1982).
42. See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 71-89 (1978).
43. See supra note 17 and infra notes 67-77 for a discussion of externalities. This
argument was offered in defense of the National Association of Broadcaster's Code
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would probably not excuse an otherwise illegal hypothetical steel
monopoly merely because monopolistically reduced steel output re-
sulted in a decrease in air pollution and a net increase in economic
welfare. 44
There are two arguments against incorporating such externalities
into antitrust case analysis. First, the inclusion of externalities requires
consideration of factors for which there is, by definition, no market in
which to evaluate their consequences. 44 Therefore, the operational
usefulness of the efficiency criterion is greatly reduced. Second, it can
be argued that policies which compensate for externalities are the
proper province of direct legislative action through taxing authority
and regulatory agencies, rather than indirect influence through dis-
cretionary nonenforcement of the antitrust laws.
The paradox is that the city or state under scrutiny is the agency
that is expected to recognize, evaluate and control the supply and
effects of externalities in public policy decisions. Thus, determining
whether a city's actions are efficient requires consideration of the same
externalities which are generally ignored in antitrust analysis. 4' It
must be noted that the set of externalities affecting a city may involve
more than conventional effects such as pollution. 47 The supply of
potential merit goods such as education or attempts to redistribute
income through the tax system also can be included. When all exter-
nalities are considered, the usual efficiency standard retains little if
any operational value. 48 Because cities or states themselves are the
proper agencies for dealing with externalities, municipal antitrust
limiting the number and duration of television commercials. The court rejected that
argument in denying the defendant's motion for summary judgment. United States v.
Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters, 536 F. Supp. 149, 161 n.48 (D.D.C. 1982). It should be
noted that the root of the market failure was never specified. For a discussion of the
relevant issue, see Brennan, Economic Efficiency and Broadcast Content Regulation,
35 FED. COMM. L.J. 117, 127 (1983).
44. See supra note 17 and infra notes 61-71 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of externalities.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Some externalities such as pollution may be partly controlled through zoning.
See generally, W. VALENTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 299-305 (2d ed. 1980) (discus-
sing regulation of environmental concerns).
48. This result contrasts sharply with the typical antitrust case involving sellers of
a particular commodity in which the consideration of externalities is a peripheral and
insignificant issue. See notes 168-69 and accompanying text.
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analysis cannot limit itself to conventional efficiency analysis. 49 The
relevant market for city action includes the externalities. They must
be considered despite the convenience of excluding them.
iii. Procedural Integrity
The central problem with both the broad ethical approach and the
efficiency approach to government behavior is that they require the
actual distribution of economic benefits to be compared against some
normative standard. Finding such a normative standard which is both
operational and acceptable is difficult. A potentially less problematic
and more viable approach examines the procedures used to achieve
particular outcomes rather than results. 50 Specifically, if municipal or
state action were taken in reasonable accord with local democratic
procedures, then federal intervention would not be appropriate. 51
Fundamentally, the welfare inferences underlying the conventional
efficiency criterion incorporate procedural criteria rather than actual
outcome evaluation. This is because preference is inferred from choice
and welfare from preference. 52 It is believed that if a consumer selects
A over B when both are available, it is better for that consumer to
obtain A because (1) people should have what they prefer and (2)
people's choices reflect their preferences.53 Under this interpretation,
the use of an efficiency criterion itself relies upon procedural criteria.
49. See supra notes 17 & 23 (discussion of externalities and the necessity for local
decisions).
50. It has been argued that procedural or "historical" principles of justice are
ethically superior to outcome or "end state" principles because the ethical value
inheres in the process itself, such as freedom of exchange, rather than the actual
distribution of goods. See NozicK, supra note 19, at 149-64 (1975). This is not a
universally shared view. Principles requiring equal distributions of wealth or
"Rawlsian" principles requiring maximization of the welfare of the least advantaged
in society are examples of well known "end state" views. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (1971).
51. This argument assumes that a city or state procedure is appropriate. If, for
example, a state rewrote its constitution to allow only landowners to vote, would
federal intervention be justified? Of course, to the degree that the United States
Constitution guarantees proper local electoral procedure, this question is moot. See
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 34, at 765-92 (electoral franchise as a funda-
mental right).
52. A. SEN, CHOICE WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 66-73 (1982) (discussing rela-
tionship between choice, preference and welfare).
53. Id. at 66 (discussing economists' interpretation of revealed preferences).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
We also rely upon procedural criteria in less fundamental ways.
Horizontal price fixing is regarded as bad not because a case-by-case
study of price fixing reveals inefficiency but, rather, because it sub-
verts a competition procedure which is expected to deliver goods to
consumers more efficiently.5 4 Vertical restraints are viewed more be-
nignly because they do not appear to systematically threaten the
integrity of the competitive allocation procedure.
55
A hypothetical situation in which a private, non-governmental
body has internal decision-making procedures that could be abused
illustrates the relevance of decision procedures. When considering the
actions of a diffusely-owned firm, it is generally assumed that the
stockholders effectively control the organization and are unanimously
interested in maximizing its profits. 56 The integrity of the firm's deci-
sion-making procedures is relied upon to infer, for example, that
output by competitive firms is supplied up to the point where price
equals marginal cost.57 This assumption may not always be valid,
however, and securities and corporation law may be viewed in part as
attempts to protect the integrity of these decision-making proce-
dures.58 The assumption of homogeneous stockholder objectives can-
54. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) ("[i]t
does not follow that agreements to fix or maintain prices are reasonable restraints and
therefore permitted by the statute, merely because the prices themselves are reason-
able"). See also, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 39, at 11; F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE 497-502 (1980).
55. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), re-
mnanded, 461 F. Supp. 1046 (N.D. Cal. 1978), af'd, 694 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1982).
The Court noted the existence of substantial scholarly and judicial authority support-
ing the economic utility of vertical restrictions. 433 U.S. at 57-58. See also SCHERER,
supra note 54 at 582-94.
56. G. SEWARD & W. NAUSS, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 97-104 (2d ed. 1977).
57. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 435-36 (11th ed. 1980). The policy intent
behind setting price equal to marginal cost is that (a) consumers, in their purchase
decisions, will equate price to marginal benefit and (b) net economic benefit is
maximized when the benefits generated by the marginal unit of output just equal
that unit's production cost. See BRENNAN, supra note 43, at 123.
58. See e.g., Securities Act, § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (1976) (registration state-
ment must be filed before securities are offered to public for sale). It has been stated
that the purpose underlying the registration requirement is the disclosure of informa-
tion that is relevant to an investor's appraisal of the merits of a particular security.
See W. CARY, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS, App. A, 68 (5th ed. 1979). See
also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 702(b)(1) (McKinney 1963) (qualifies board of directors'
rights to adopt by-law setting number of directors). This provision limits the direc-
tors' power to control the structure of the board unless such power has been granted
by the stockholders. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 702(b)(1) note on legislative studies and
reports (McKinney 1963).
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not be applied as readily to municipalities, considering the city resi-
dents' diverse preferences regarding proper municipal behavior.
Furthermore, it is easier for a dissatisfied stockholder to "leave" the
firm by selling his stock and moving to another company by reinvest-
ing than for a person to move to a city with policies more to his liking.
Unfortunately, we lack a political theory analogue to the efficiency
theorems of welfare economies which would justify an inference of
efficient performance from specific political procedures. It may be
difficult to identify a city's or state's procedures before questioning
whether they have been violated. Recognizing these problems, proce-
dural integrity, rather than efficiency or general ethics, is the most
useful way to decide whether cities are properly representing their
citizens. While there are severe problems posed in applying a proce-
dural integrity test,59 the other criteria discussed above are insuffi-
ciently operational to arrive at a conclusion to endorse or reject fed-
eral intervention in local affairs. Although procedural integrity may
appear undirected or unfamiliar, it is fundamental to conventional
analyses of antitrust matters.6 0
3. Externalities
The third argument in favor of Federal intervention is that there
may be "externalities" affecting parties outside the locality.6 1 If these
"externalities" are present, the affected outside parties can influence
the relevant internal decisions only through a more encompassing
level of government. The possible effects of local action on outside
parties include a distributional effect resulting from changes in wealth
caused by the action, and an efficiency effect resulting from changes
in incentives caused by the action. 2 Moreover, efficiency effects re-
sulting from the exercise of market power may be distinguished from
those resulting from unpriced third party influences, such as air pollu-
tion. Because of its specific focus on market power, antitrust interven-
59. For example, assumptions needed for policy making may not be valid in all
cases, see supra note 58, or identifying a normative standard as a procedural goal
may be difficult. See supra text accompanying note 50.
60. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effect of
majority rule on the market.
61. See supra notes 17 and accompanying text for a definition of externalities.
62. There may be an additional distributional effect resulting from changes in
wealth caused by the action. See SAMUELSON, supra note 57, at 762-68 for a discus-
sion of income distribution and redistribution. However, from an economic policy
perspective, this effect is of little interest.
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tion would be appropriate only if the local action led to an exercise of
market power against outside parties. 63
An externality analysis can be applied to Parker v. Brown,64 the
seminal "state action" decision. In Parker, a cartel of California raisin
growers was created under an act of the California legislature.6 5 The
court held that the growers' actions pursuant to the statute did not
violate the Sherman Act or the commerce clause, although they would
have been unlawful without the authorization of the state statute.
Thus, the state's action immunized the growers from antitrust liabil-
ity. 6  According to an externality analysis, the decision in this case was
economically unwise. If we assume that California raisin growers had
power in the United States market for raisins, this action created a
predictable inefficiency affecting raisin consumers outside California.
The only way out-of-state buyers could prevent this type of ineffi-
ciency would be to act through the federal government, since they
cannot vote in California elections.
An externality analysis must be applied regardless of whether the
alleged practice involves selling products to, or buying items from,
those outside the locality. The raisin example in Parker is a clear case
of a "seller" locality monopolistically exploiting parties outside the
state.6 7 A hypothetical example of market power on the "buying" side
would be a "buyer" city which elected to purchase all of its concrete
collectively. This city would likely gain significant power against
nearby concrete plants, considering concrete's high transportation
cost. Nevertheless, it is likely that the market power problems are
more severe on the selling side than on the buying side. While con-
sumers normally exhibit some continued willingness to pay as the
price for a product increases,68 suppliers are more likely to be highly
sensitive to price because the long-term average cost is likely to be
constant absent demonstrable, significant economies or diseconom ies
63. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case in
which state statutes regulating the pricing and distribution of raisins constituted the
externality.
64. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Parker.
65. Parker, 317 U.S. at 350. See infra note 86 for a citation of the California
statute at issue in Parker.
66. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 368.
67. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350 for a discussion of the provision's potential effect
on interstate commerce.
68. SAMUELSON, supra note 57, at 58-59 (willingness to pay will be limited to
reduced quantities of the product as price increases).
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of scale69 and because sellers are often more mobile than final cus-
tomers. 70 A municipality's exclusion of outside entry into its markets
would have a significant external effect only if the potential entrants
could not enter other local markets equally well. 7'
C. Cable Television As An Example
The operation of the various criteria for restriction of municipal
activity can be illustrated by using cable television franchising as an
example. Economic reasoning suggests that decentralized decision-
making avoids costly centralizing of information and provides the
correlation of the abilities and incentives necessary to produce effi-
cient decisions, 72 assuming the absence of externalities.73 This reason-
ing suggests that the central government should not interfere with the
economic decisions of local governments unless there are (1) econo-
69. Situations with persistent economies of scale tend to have just one firm in the
market and are referred to as natural monopolies. See S. BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS
REFORM 15 (1982).
70. If enough cities colluded, they could affect the market by taking away the
alternate sales opportunities for the sellers. For example, assume there are ten sellers
of cable television services, each seeking customers. Assume further that the entire
country consists of 100 cities, each of which allows cable service installation only
upon municipal approval. If all the cities collusively adopted the same contract terms
under which they would allow cable installations, there would, in effect, be only one
buyer. This would be a "monopsony" situation. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS,
supra note 17, at 673 (a monopsony is a market structure with only a single buyer of a
commodity or service); SAMUELSON, supra note 57, at 548-49. A monopsony situation
is more commonly recognized in the case of a "company town" where the local
residents, sellers of labor, face but a single buyer who controls their fate by its
decision of whose services it will purchase. Id.
71. See Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. OF L.
ECON. 23, 45 (1983), for a discussion of potential state monopoly power. Easterbrook
neglects the other two criteria outlined in this Article by assuming that poor perform-
ance by city governments will be held in check by competition among cities for
residents. Id. at 34. Easterbrook's view of elastic consumer mobility implies that local
private monopolists or cartels could not possess market power as well. This Article
endorses the view that competition among cities for residents is at best a long-run
phenomenon and it is not strong enough to ensure continued optimum government
performance. Since relocation is slow and costly, encouraging government officials to
act in ways to maximize the welfare of current residents is difficult. The post-Parker
case law arguably responds to this problem by establishing procedural guidelines to
increase the likelihood that local governments will effectively reflect the interests of
their constituents. Easterbrook employs a similar but narrower view which focuses
on the argument that regulators tend to be captured by the regulated. Id. at 27.
72. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
73. See supra note 17 for a discussion of externalities.
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mies of expertise in selecting or regulating cable systems,74 (2) predict-
able discrepancies between consumer preferences regarding cable tele-
vision systems and the local decisions on the system's size, channel
capacity, access requirements, or other characteristics,7 5 or (3) effi-
ciency-reducing effects on outsiders from the local cable franchising
system or regulatory process.76 The controlling issue is whether federal
restriction of the local cable franchising authority can be rationalized
by one of these three conditions.
Turning first to the informational economies, it can be argued that
the choice of optimal cable service is so complex that the federal
government should save the costs of repeated city decisions by setting
uniform standards. 77 Cities, however, like other large economic enti-
ties, appear capable of soliciting whatever expert advice they require
in making their decisions. In addition, unlike consumers, the parties
ostensibly harmed by any perceived lack of information, the cities,
have not demanded legislative protection.78
With regard to the "procedural integrity" point, an argument for
federal limits on local government decisions is that problems with
electoral procedures or with the monitoring of official performance
will result in predictably inefficient local cable service. The argu-
ments are inconclusive when applied to electoral procedure. Although
in theory majority-rule voting may render minority interests under-
represented when compared to their willingness to pay, 79 the actual
ability of special interest groups to influence voting outcomes may
actually overemphasize a minority opinion. This argument might
favor limiting city involvement in cable selection, but the need for
public approval before disrupting public rights-of-way when laying
cable lines and the need for competition at the franchise level make
city involvement in cable selection inevitable.
74. See supra notes 22-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of economies of
expertise.
75. See supra notes 27-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proce-
dural means for ensuring proper procedures to be employed in reconciling competing
interests.
76. See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of efficiency.
77. The author is aware of no support for this argument. See infra note 78 and
accompanying text.
78. In part, this may be because cities receive guidance from the observation of
others' selections and service. This situation can be compared to other areas to which
federal consumer legislation protections have been applied. See, e.g., Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1431 (1976). The Congressional purpose in
establishing Chapter 38 was to reduce traffic accidents and related deaths and
injuries. Federal involvement in establishing safety standards and supporting re-
search were components of the Congressional program. Id. at § 1381.
79. See supra note 30.
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Arguably, it is difficult to prevent municipal officials from deriving
benefits from the regulation of cable systems. This problem is better
addressed through other restrictions on incumbents' behavior rather
than antitrust penalties. Incumbents also could have an incentive to
use a cable system for free publicity through mandatory coverage of
municipal activities over public access channels. It is, of course, im-
possible to divorce this private interest from the potential public
interest in having such proceedings televised. Possibly, any bias could
be weakened by an "equal time" requirement, but this approach
would probably be impractical because of interpretative difficulties.
The final case for intervention, the presence of inefficiency-creating
"externalities," would be relevant if such an effect could be identified
as the result of municipal cable franchising. Pertinent concerns re-
garding the output side are eliminated because the city's cable sub-
scribers have significant authority over franchising through direct or
indirect electoral control of the franchising body. Relevant concerns
relating to the inputs into cable television can surface in two areas.
The first determinant, whether a given city can exercise market
power in the cable system market, is unlikely to occur. While differing
geographical locations may restrict direct competition, cities may
manuever against each other as buyers in the cable system market to
some extent. Additionally, the diversity of ownership in the cable
market suggests that many firms are able to construct cable systems
efficiently. The supply of cable systems of a given quality is, therefore,
highly sensitive to price, thus limiting the ability of cities to reduce
that price through negotiations.8" Second, the city might permit its
cable system to charge monopoly rates to programmers for the use of
channels. Since some cable programmers may be willing to pay more
than an economically efficient price for access to a local television
market, this possibility cannot be readily dismissed and federal action
to regulate access charges could be justified. 81
80. If a large group of cities colludes, the likelihood of monopsony becomes more
likely. See supra note 76.
81. The Federal Communications Commission is currently precluded from man-
dating that cable channels be made available for leased access. Federal Conmunica-
tions Comm'n v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 709 (1979) (FCC may not
regulate cable systems as common carriers). In 1983, a bill was introduced in the
Senate to limit local regulatory and franchising authority. See S. 66, "The Cable
Telecommunications Act of 1983", 98th Cong., 1st Sess., i29 CONG. REG. 58,308-09
(1983). According to the sponsors of this proposed legislation, it would:
(1) establish a national policy concerning cable telecommunications and to en-
courage a competitive environment for the growth and development of cable tele-
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D. Summary
Confidence in the free market as an efficient allocation mechanism
relies upon the assumptions that (1) information can be efficiently
distributed to agents; (2) agents have incentives to act in their best
interests; and (3) all parties affected by a transaction can influence it.
Applied to political units, these principles require that if the unit (1) is
able to identify expertise efficiently; (2) has incentives to act in the
best interest of its constituents; and (3) designs its decisions to avoid
adverse effects on non-constituents, then federal intervention in trans-
actions undertaken or controlled by those local political units is not
justified. However, these assumptions may fail when applied to either
consumers or political units. Therefore, although a presumption in
favor of non-intervention may be proper, the failure of these assump-
tions to operate in a specific case may warrant some form of "higher
order," specifically federal intervention for certain classes of local
government action. This intervention can take the form of a subsi-
dized information provision, specific restrictions, regulation, or anti-
trust liability. An examination of the case law will demonstrate how
antitrust liability has been imposed.8 2
III. Evaluating The "State Action" Antitrust Case Law
This section will examine the principal cases which have defined
the case law for restricting the independent activity of state or local
governments. The analysis will test the usefulness of the three eco-
nomic criteria by evaluating the major state action cases to determine
if this economic analysis would yield a result which differs from the
Court's.
A. Parker v. Brown83
Appellee was a producer and packer of raisins in California. 84 In
this case the legislature of California passed an act establishing pro-
communications; (2) establish guidelines for the exercise of Federal, State, and local
regulatory authority; and (3) allow cable systems to compete in the marketplace on
an equal basis with other providers of telecommunications services to the public. Id.
at 5326 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1983). Policy considerations of the sort discussed above
have not been applied in the debate on this legislation.
82. Regulation is applied to offset anti-competitive conditions. See infra note 149
for a discussion of utilities regulation.
83. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
84. Id. at 344.
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grams for the marketing of state-produced agricultural commodities.8 5
Specifically, the California Agricultural Prorate Act8" authorized the
creation of a state-selected "program committee" to prorate sales
among crop producers, making sales outside the prorated limits ille-
gal. 87 The Court noted further that the effect of this Act was to
restrain competition and to maintain agricultural prices. 88 According
to the Court, the region of California affected by the Act's limitations
supplied "almost all the raisins consumed in the United States .....- 89
The Court held that the program was not a violation of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act 90 since unlike "a contract, combination or conspir-
acy of private persons," 9' it "derived its authority and its efficacy from
the legislative command of the state. ' 92 If we assume that raisins
constitute a relevant product market, then the effect of the state
action was to allow California raisin growers to extract monopoly
profits by raising the price of raisins. The effect of this was an exertion
of market power, almost certainly against non-California residents.
Using the economic grounds set out above, 93 therefore, this case was
decided incorrectly. 94
B. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar95
In Goldfarb, home buyers in Fairfax County, Virginia brought a
class action suit against the State and County Bar, claiming that a
minimum fee schedule for searching titles constituted illegal price-
fixing. 96 The Supreme Court agreed that the minimum title search fee
was a price fix. Unlike the program in Parker,97 however, this fee-
85. See snpra notes 64-66 and accompanying text for an additional discussion of
the facts.
86. Act of June 5, 1983, ch. 754, Statutes of California of 1933, as amended b\
chs. 471 & 473, statutes of 1935; ch. 6, Extra Session, 1938; chs. 363, 548 & 894,
statutes of 1939; and chs. 603, 1150 & 1186, statutes of 1941.
87. 317 U.S. at 346-47.
88. Id. at 346.
89. Id. at 345.
90. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976 & Stipp. VI 1983).
91. 317 U.S. at 350.
92. Id. See generally, Comment, The State Action Exemption in Antitrust: From
Parker v. Brown to Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 1977 DUKE L.J. 871 (1977).
93. See supra notes 67-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of externalities.
94. The District Court in Parker held that the Act was illegal, specifically noting
its interstate economic consequences. 39 F. Supp. 895, 901-02 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
95. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
96. Id. at 778.
97. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
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setting was found illegal because it was not "compelled by direction of
the State acting as a sovereign. " 98 The most favorable interpretation of
this decision, in light of this Article's economic framework, is that the
Supreme Court found that proper procedures were not followed when
arriving at a potentially anticompetitive result. This articulation
seems to be a reasonable approach to practical implementation of the
"procedural integrity" criterion."
This manner of implementation, which judges the "sufficiency" of
active control by the state and characterizes this and cases to follow,
raises an important consideration. When violations of procedural in-
tegrity involve private corruption of the political process, it would be
appropriate to place liability on the corrupt individuals and not on the
political entity as a whole. However, in Goldfarb there is no apparent
private corruption; rather, the judiciary decided that the legislative
and executive procedures that were followed were not sufficient to
justify the anticompetitive outcome. Therefore, assigning antitrust
liability to cities in cases where "procedural integrity" is violated with
apparently anticompetitive effect could be proper, even while the
officials acted in accordance with the deficient procedures. 100
C. Cantor v. Detroit Edison'0 '
In Cantor, a retailer who sold light bulbs challenged Detroit Edi-
son's program of giving away free light bulbs as an illegal tie-in of
bulbs to electricity and therefore an attempted monopoly. 0 2 This
practice was found invalid by the Supreme Court, largely on the
grounds that the program was instituted at the initiative of a private
utility rather than a state body.' 03 The mere existence of implicit
98. 421 U.S. at 791. See generally, Note, State Action And the Sherman Antitrust
Act: Should the Antitrust Laws be Given a Presumptive Effect? 14 CONN. L. REV.
135 (1981) [hereinafter cited as STATE ACTION]; Note, Parker v. Brown Revisited: The
State Action Doctrine after Goldfarb, Cantor, and Bates, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 898
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Parker v. Brown Revisited].
99. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text.
100. An interesting alternative is the Athenian "graphe paranomon," in which a
legislator making an illegal proposal to the legislature could be criminally tried even
if the legislature had passed the proposal. See ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND IRRATIONALITY 89 (1979).
101. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
102. Id. at 581.
103. Id. at 591-92 (Parker not controlling because defendant is private utility).
The case was remanded for determination of "whether the complaint alleged a
violation of the antitrust laws . I..." d. at 603.
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regulatory approval °4 was insufficient to exempt the utility from
antitrust liability. 105
The Court's requirement that antitrust liability not be imposed for
"actions taken" pursuant to "express legislative command"'0 6 can be
interpreted as refining the "procedural integrity" standard as origi-
nally set out in Goldfarb. However, it is not clear why regulatory
approval is insufficient to ensure that "procedural integrity" is satis-
fied, absent a specific showing of deficient regulatory procedures or
official violations. Detroit Edison's program seems inefficient, and
some economic theory suggests that regulatory agencies have a ten-
dency to act in the interests of those they regulate. 10 7 On the other
hand, it is not obvious that Detroit Edison profited monopolistically
from its practice. 108 Apparently the light bulb giveaway was largely
for advertising and public relations purposes. We then enter some-
thing of a gray area, because the welfare analysis of shifts in demand
resulting from such promotion can be ambiguous. 109 It is conceivable
that when the totality of the circumstances described above is consid-
ered, regulatory agency approval should be a sufficient defense.
D. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona" °
Two attorneys in Arizona claimed that a ban by the Arizona Su-
preme Court"' on advertising by lawyers limited competition and
violated their first amendment rights."l2 The Sherman Act challenge
was denied by the Supreme Court because the state policy was
"clearly and affirmatively expressed" and was actively supervised by
the Arizona Supreme Court.' 3 This case illustrates some of the con-
104. id. at 583.
105. Id. at 598. See also, Werden & Balmer, Conflicts Between State Law and the
Sherman Act, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1982); STATE ACTION, supra note 98, at 144-
49 for a discussion of Cantor.
106. 428 U.S. at 589.
107. See, Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
108. Conceivably, if the regulated rate of return is excessive, there may be gains
from expanding the rate base associated with giving away light bulbs.
109. See Fisher & McGowan, Advertising and Welfare: Comment 10 BELL J.
EcoN. 726 (1979); Dixit & Norman, Advertising and Welfare: Reply, 10 BELL J.
EcoN. 728 (1979).
110. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
111. 17A ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. S. CT. RULE 29(a) (1973) (adopting code of
Professional Responsibility of American Bar Association, except D.R.2-105(A)(4) and
D.R.6-101(A)(1)).
112. Id. at 356.
113. Id. at 362.
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ceptual problems posed by Cantor. Continuing the "procedural integ-
rity" analysis, it would be argued that state supreme courts are "rea-
sonable" regulators. It is not apparent, however, that state supreme
courts regulate more in the public interest than did the regulatory
agency in Cantor. On the assumption that there was no statute"14
prohibiting lawyer advertising in Arizona, it is not easy to reconcile
the Cantor and Bates decisions. There may be an argument that the
regulatory agency in Cantor did not "clearly and affirmatively ex-
press" the desirability of free light bulbs, only passively accepting
Detroit Edison's tariff proposals. It would be simpler to conclude,
however, that the Supreme Court generally frowns on promotional
giveaways or advertising.
E. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light"15
In this case, several cities, including Lafayette, owned and operated
electric utilities within their limits. They sued Louisiana Power and
Light, a privately owned utility, claiming attempts to restrain trade
by boycotts, refusals to sell power, and engaging in sham litigation. "16
Louisiana Power and Light filed a counterclaim, alleging a conspiracy
of the municipalities to engage in sham litigation, foreclose competi-
tion through long-term supply agreements, and tie the provision of
electricity to purchases of water and gas service." 7 The cities argued
that the "state action" doctrine rendered them immune.
Lafayette was the first case in which the Court refused to extend the
state action immunity of Parker to municipalities. The Court affirmed
the relevant appellate court opinion, which found that city actions are
immune only if they are taken pursuant to a state policy meeting the
Goldfarb standard." 8 The constitutional "sovereignty" of the state
does not extend to its cities. 119 The Court specifically noted that
neutral courts existed to ensure that competition would ensue "with-
out regard to the amount of influence [any enterprise] might have
with local or state legislatures."' 20
114. But see supra note 111 (an Arizona Supreme Court rule was involved in the
case).
115. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See generally State Action, supra note 106, at 151-54 for
a discussion of Lafayette.
116. Id. at 392 n.5.
117. Id. at 392 n.6.
118. 435 U.S. 394 (citing 532 F.2d 534-35).
119. Id. at 412. See also Werden & Balmer, supra note 105, at 12.
120. 435 U.S. at 407. It is noteworthy that the Court cited the large number of
local government units in the United States (62,437) in refusing to extend antitrust
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The Lafayette decision relied upon two important claims. First, the
court imposed a requirement that the state must be actively involved
in a city's actions.12 1 This requirement is not justified by economic
theory.1 22 The economic analysis of government actions makes no
distinction between states and cities. If a city's action reflects available
information, is procedurally adequate with respect to its residents,
and reflects no market power, then the action should be allowed.
Hence, regardless of the empirical merits of the Lafayette decision,
the argument that state policy is even relevant to the appraisal of a
city's decision is unsound.
The second claim made in Lafayette is that legislative procedure
itself may not be sufficient to permit exceptions to the antitrust
laws. 2 3 This says, in effect, that no collective decision through the
political process can excuse anticompetitive conduct. Moreover, one
wonders what constitutes a "clear and articulate expression" by the
state if state statutes do not fulfill the standard. Subsequent case law
does not seem to have retained this extreme position. 124 It might be
claimed that only city "legislatures" would enact laws subverting the
competitive process. The performance of state legislatures and Con-
gress lends little support to this argument.
F. California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc. 125
Midcal Aluminum challenged a California law authorizing a uni-
form wholesale price maintenance scheme for wine.126 The Court
found that this statute unreasonably restrained trade by mandating,
immunity. Id. at 407-08 (citing U.S. Bureau of the Census). This seems counter to the
general principle that competition is aided, and collusive conduct deterred, by large
numbers of economic actors. See SCHERER, supra note 54, at 199-200.
121. 435 U.S. at 413 ("Parker doctrine exempts only anticompetitive conduct
engaged in as an act of government by the State as sovereign, or, by its subdivisions,
pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public
service"). Id.
122. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
123. 435 U.S. at 406 (Congress "did not leave this fundamental National policy [of
competition] to the vagaries of the political process...").
124. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97
(1980) (Court found statutory expression clear and articulate, but held contested
conduct illegal because not actively supervised by state). See also supra notes 121-23
and accompanying text (arguing against the second Lafayette claim).
125. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
126. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24862 (West Supp. 1979) (repealed 1980 CAL.
STATS. ch. 1368, § 5).
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but not supervising, the resale price maintenance program. 2 ' Al-
though the policy was clearly and affirmatively articulated in a stat-
ute that met the Bates and Cantor tests, 2 the Court formally incorpo-
rated the requirement that the state "actively supervise" the
anticompetive conduct.129 Such supervision was judged not forthcom-
ing in Midcal.130
One could optimistically conclude that the Court was simply refin-
ing the "procedural integrity" criterion on the basis of general expec-
tations as to its propriety. However, one can also conclude that the
criterion is being "refined" on an ad hoc basis to fit the Court's beliefs
about the efficiency of a specific practice. "Procedural integrity" crite-
ria should be tested by the kinds of practices they permit. Since city
intervention in a market may serve to compensate for economic effects
outside that market, however, an independent efficiency test has
serious weaknesses when used to assess city actions. 1  The Midcal
decision leaves the impression that the Court was really using such a
test, albeit camouflaged by procedural criteria like "clear expression"
and "active supervision."
G. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder'13 2
This case started the recent flurry of activity on municipal antitrust
liability. Boulder imposed a moratorium on expansion by its cable
system to give itself additional time to prepare new cable legislation.
In response, the cable system sued Boulder, claiming this restriction
would violate section one of the Sherman Act. 133 As a defense, Boulder
127. 445 U.S. at 102.
128. See supra notes 110-14 (Bates) & 109-17 (Cantor) and accompanying text.
129. 445 U.S. at 105 (citing Lafayette, 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978)). See also supra
notes 115-24 and accompanying text (Lafayette).
130. 445 U.S. at 105-06.
131. See text preceding note 48.
132. 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. VI 1983).
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person vho shall make any
contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be
illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall
be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or,
if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the
court.
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defense, Boulder claimed that cities inherited the state authority of
Parker through "home rule" statutes. The Court abrogated this de-
fense.134 The city's action must meet the Midcal tests of clear and
affirmative articulation and active supervision by the state. 135 Since
Colorado had no specific policy regarding cable television, Boulder
lost the case.' 36 The Boulder decision, which adds nothing to the
"procedural integrity" interpretation, reaffirms the unjustified neces-
sity for state involvement in city affairs. 37
H. Synthesis
The "economies of expertise" criterion 38 does not significantly in-
fluence the outcome in these cases. Rather, most of the case law could
be interpreted as delineating the procedural requirements 39 for insti-
tuting seemingly anticompetitive conduct. Specifically, these proce-
dural requirements refer to the judicial mandate stating that immu-
nity is available only for actions that have been clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed, as well as actively and exclusively supervised
by the State. 40 Some of these decisions, however, imply that the
Court's evolution of these requirements has been more a function of
views on the factual effects in the specific instances rather than an
appeal to a theory of procedural integrity. In Cantor, the Court noted
that light bulbs were not a necessary facet of electric utility regula-
tion. "4 In Midcal, the Court emphasized the apparent illegality of the
wholesale price maintenance scheme. 42 These decisions suggest that
the evolution of the case law has been guided not only by a theory of
134. 455 U.S. at 53.
135. Id. at 52.
136. Id. at 55.
137. It may be argued that the Court's insistence on state supervision may be an
application of a particular view of "procedural integrity." Except where a city's
action affects others within the state, however, this interpretation of "procedural
integrity" would be unsound. Under the analytical framework employed here, that
criterion is designed specifically for the evaluation of a government's actions affecting
only its constituents. If a state feels that its interests are being harmed by the actions
of one of its cities, however, it can remedy the matter by either passing its own laws
restricting city actions or by bringing an action against the city.
138. Seesupra notes 22-26 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the theory
and importance of procedural integrity.
140. See supra notes 95-113, 126-31 and accompanying text.
141. 428 U.S. 579, 598 (1976).
142. 445 U.S. 97, 102 (1980).
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proper procedural considerations, but also by the nature of specific
fact situations confronted by the Court.
The third criterion, the exercise of market power against non-
constitutents, generally was not considered. This is understandable
since, in all of these cases but Parker, there were no substantial
exercises of market power outside the local government's jurisdiction.
In Parker, however, where the effects on non-constituents were para-
mount and recognized by both circuit and state supreme courts, 43 the
Supreme Court decided incorrectly by ignoring the effects of these
externalities. 4 4 In addition, the Lafayette and Boulder decisions im-
posed a requirement of state involvement in city decisions 45 which is
unjustified by economic policy considerations unless the city actions
result in the exercise of market power against those residing outside
the city. 146
IV. Policy And Implications
A. Economies of Expertise
Under this rationale, the federal government may be better able to
make economic choices which benefit the city residents' interests than
the local government. This ability would result from economies of
both scale and expertise in making certain types of decisions. Specifi-
cally, it may be less costly for the federal government to make deci-
sions for a number of cities, either at one uniform time or repeatedly,
than it would be for each city to acquire the expertise necessary to
render an optimal decision.' 47
The "economies of expertise" policy distinguishes between cities
that realize their expertise limitations and those which do not. The
optimal policy concerning the former would be to direct the federal
government to supply the necessary information to the cities at mar-
ginal cost.148 Since the essence of the city's failure to allocate effi-
143. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. Also, if the wholesale price
maintenance scheme in Midcal applied to out-of-state retailers, external effects could
pose a problem if California wineries possess economic power in a relevant wine
market.
145. See supra notes 115-24 (Lafayette), 132-37 (Boulder) and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 22-26 for a discussion of economies of expertise.
148. A complete cost-benefit calculation would include the welfare effects of the
taxes needed to support this program. See Samuelson supra note 57 at 429 (marginal
cost at any production level is the extra cost of producing one extra unit more (or
less)).
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ciently is the high cost it faces for procuring necessary economic
information on its own, it would be preferable to give the city the
required information rather than hold it liable under the antitrust
laws for not using it in the formation of its policy.
Applying the economies of expertise policy to a city which is un-
aware of its ignorance is more difficult because the local entity must
either be convinced of its need for the expert information or forced to
accept it. Legitimate government action concerning these cities should
be limited to advertising that the needed expert information is easily
available. In cases where paternalistic intervention can be justified,
specific legislative prohibitions may be reasonable, although they can
easily induce the inefficiency that inevitably follows from statutory
restriction of consumer choice. 149 Except for making expertise on com-
petitive effects available at no or low cost, as in the antitrust "business
review" procedure, 150 no other policies, including antitrust liability,
are likely to be efficient or workable. 51 Making determinations that
the city properly utilized the available information, however, is likely
to be highly problematic. Antitrust liabilty could be utilized as an
incentive to use available information.
The "economies of expertise" analysis, although theoretically
sound, does not appear to have played a significant role in the legal
development of municipal antitrust liability. While no strong affirma-
tive action seems economically warranted, it would be advantageous
for the federal government to provide, upon the local government's
recognition of its information need and its subsequent request, an
assessment of an actual or prospective local government action's effect
on competition. 152 Unless the demand for such assessments becomes
149. These inefficiencies are recognized and government regulation is applied to
regulate prices and profits. Rate-regulated public utilities are an illustration of this
response. BREYER, supra note 69, at 15-16.
150. See 28 C.F.R. 50.6 (1983) (Antitrust Division business review procedure).
The Department of Justice is not authorized to give advisory opinions to private
parties, but the Antitrust Division, in certain circumstances, has reviewed proposed
business conduct and stated its enforcement intentions. Id.
151. For example, the policy of imposing malpractice liability is potentially a way
to ensure that doctors obtain and use information needed to make reasonable deci-
sions regarding medical care. However, this may not be an efficient or practical way
to control whether consumers are served by unlicensed doctors or given unlicensed
drugs. This analogy also illustrates the practical problems in determining whether
information was properly employed.
152. The Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission are sources of the
relevant expertise.
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expensive, this information should be freely available to encourage the
consideration of the competitive consequences of public actions. Such
a policy would be consistent with the current Antitrust Division policy
of filing advisory comments on the competitive effects of actions being
considered by regulatory agencies. 153
B. Procedural Integrity
This rationale justifies federal intervention in city or state actions if
those actions were not undertaken in accord with proper procedural
principles of democratic government. 54 There are two important
general cases, with the significant variable being whether the city or
state action was the result of officials acting within or outside of their
legal authority.
The standard example of a potentially anticompetitive 155 action
taken by officials acting outside their legal authority would be a city
official who utilized his ability to control entry into markets through
franchising or zoning for personal gain. The primary damage in this
case results from the corrupt behavior of the officials in question. For
this reason, liablilty enforced through anti-corruption or anti-bribery
laws would probably be more efficient, particularly when compared
to the less direct and more problematic use of the antitrust laws. For
example, the corrupt official himself may not be a competitor in the
relevant market. 156 When the issue is essentially corruption, society is
improperly served by invoking the antitrust laws with their specific
focus on the remedies of competition and performance in the market-
place. 157 However, the city probably should not be liable under the
antitrust laws for actions independently taken by its officers unless it
was ultimately responsible, for example, by not sufficiently policing
its officials' conduct.
A more difficult case arises when the city's actions are taken within
the authority granted to its officials. To find municipal antitrust
153. See Baxter, supra note 40, at 700.
154. See supra notes 27-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proce-
dural integrity theory.
155. If the action were not potentially anticompetitive, it would not raise antitrust
concerns regardless of fidelity to proper procedures.
156. See Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, 1 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
4502.10 (1982) for a discussion of market definition.
157. See text following supra note 99 & 155, stating that other laws are better
suited for addressing these problems.
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liability in this case requires that the authority structure of the city,
such as the decision procedures, be found improper. This again raises
the complexities inherent in the procedural integrity rationale. 158 Effi-
ciency standards are of questionable operational value in evaluating
local government procedures. A better alternative would be to exam-
ine the procedural standards themselves-to determine, for example,
whether the issue received a fair hearing, whether it was publicized,
and whether a significant institutional hurdle such as legislative enact-
ment had to be met. 15 9 The appropriate standards are not easy to
determine. 6 0 In addition, a particular type of "levels problem" may
exist. If the immediate procedures appear inappropriate but are in
accord with a constitution or charter that was enacted using "proper"
procedures, to which governmental level should the procedural integ-
rity evaluation standard be applied? Does the propriety of the consti-
tution inure to the immediate action? 17 The propriety of procedures
cannot be based solely on procedural grounds; appeals to other, more
fundamental criteria beyond the scope of this Article inevitably must
be applied to settle these sorts of questions.
These are complex philosophical and economic issues in which a
gradual evolution of thought is more likely to provide a reasonable
approach than an instant legislative mandate. The case law could be
interpreted as an effort to come to grips with this issue, 162 and because
of its ongoing dialectical nature, case law is the proper forum in which
to debate this issue. However, as Lafayette and Boulder demonstrate,
the law treats cities differently from states, requiring active state
supervision of city actions. 16 3 This distinction is unwarranted on eco-
nomic grounds. Cities should be treated in the same manner as states
when their actions are judged by procedural criteria such as the
degree of articulation or supervision. If a state action would be legal
158. See supra notes 27-60 and accompanying text.
159. The concept of examining the process employed by a locality in instituting an
erstwhile anticompetitive policy is analogous to examining the procedural due proc-
ess protection accorded to government deprivations of life, liberty or property. See
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 34, at 526-30.
160. See text preceding supra note 50.
161. Moreover, this "levels problem" itself leads to an "infinite regress" of sorts:
city actions are chosen in accord with legislative rules chosen in accord with charters
chosen in accord with . . .ad infinitum.
162. For a discussion of the procedural integrity criterion in the state action case
law, see supra notes 95-131 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
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because it was in accord with reasonable procedures, then an analo-
gous city action should similarly be accepted without the state "chap-
eroning" that the case law currently requires. Cities should be im-
mune from antitrust liability for actions by the city's officers which
exceed their authority. Liability should rest with the responsible per-
son, although assignment of ultimate responsibility among the city
and its officials could become complex.
C. Externalities
The antitrust problem presented by externalities arises when a city
or state has power in a relevant economic market and elects to use that
power against non-constituents." 4 Unlike the "procedural integrity"
issue, this problem is arguably no worse than the typical antitrust
case. If a city or state takes an action equivalent to cartelization by its
resident firms and such action would have market power conse-
quences to residents outside that jurisdiction, then antitrust law is the
appropriate tool. 65 First, the external effect must involve an effi-
ciency, not simply a reallocation of commerce. For example, one steel
company could not successfully sue an automobile firm under the
antitrust laws for simply awarding a contract to another steel com-
pany. Likewise, a city should not be liable to suit by one cable firm if
it awards its cable franchise, in accord with proper procedures, to
another.
Second, as a pragmatic matter, states are more likely to exert
market power than cities by virtue of their greater geographic breadth
and coverage of more competitors. This is not to say that cities may
never be relevant areas for assessing market power in this context. For
example, collusion among the docks in a port city could exert monop-
oly power against consumers or firms over a wide area. In addition,
many cities, particularly large ones, may have enough of the firms in
the relevant market16 within their jurisdiction to be able to exert
market power against non-residents. For the pragmatic reasons dis-
164. Use of that power against its own constituents is a (uestion of whether the
city is acting in accord with its residents' interests. This question falls under the first
two headings of expertise economies and procedural integrity.
165. See text following infra note 179. See also supra notes 48-53 and accompany-
ing text.
166. See Merger Guidelines of Department of Justice, 1 TRADE REC. REP. (CCH)
4502.30 (1982) for a definition of "relevant geographic market" in the antitrust
context.
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cussed above, however, concerns regarding anticompetitive external-
ities are more likely to be serious in cases involving states rather than
in those involving counties or cities. 1 7
The "externality" issue has been ignored by the courts. The seminal
state action case in this area, Parker, was decided incorrectly when
judged on economic grounds because it ignored the external effects of
the state action.168 As some commentators have suggested, a decision
effectively reversing Parker would be appropriate, either through
legislation or judicial decision. 69 Thus, besides the procedural stan-
dards implied in the case law, which should be equally applied to
cities and states, the issue of using market power against non-residents
must be included in evaluating state or local actions.
V. Conclusion
This Article has utilized economic analysis rationale for decentral-
ized decision-making to assess the antitrust liability of local govern-
ment actions. Three criteria, economies of expertise, integrity of pub-
lic decision-making procedures, and external harms to
non-constituents provide an analytical framework. The major state
action and municipal antitrust case law represents an evolution of
standards emphasizing procedural integrity. External effects, how-
ever, have been misjudged. In Parker their existence was ignored,
while in Lafayette and Boulder cities were held liable absent a show-
ing that market power was exerted against non-residents as a result of
the challenged actions.
167. If the inefficient external effects result not from market power but from
market failure, federal involvement also may be appropriate. For example, air
pollution crossing state lines would fit into this category. This kind of situation,
however, does not seem to raise antitrust concerns.
168. See supra notes 64-67, 93-94 and accompanying text.
169. See Werden & Balmer, supra note 105, at 69-72. These authors examine
intent, rather than procedural integrity or externalities, to determine the validity of
state statutes. Id. at 64. Without commenting on the legality of this approach, it
seems ill-advised on economic grounds. As argued above, the normative basis for
economic efficiency is grounded in part on the autonomy of the decision-maker who
reaps the burdens and bears the costs of its actions. See supra note 16 and accompa-
nying text. If a community elects, for whatever reason, to create monopoly power
against itself, this decision should be implemented unless ignorance, procedural
abuse or external effect can be shown.
170. See supra notes 147-69 and accompanying text for discussion of recom-
mended policies.
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be implemented to enable the federal government to provide expert
information at marginal cost to officials contemplating potential or
actual local governmental activity. In addition, anticipatory consider-
ation of the competitive consequences of public actions should be
encouraged. The flexible and evolutionary approach to procedural
integrity found in the state action case law should be maintained. In
addition, procedural criteria distinctions between state level and city
level actions should be eliminated. Finally, the exercise of market
power by a local government against non-constituents should be
grounds for antitrust liability.
